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THE POLICE POWER AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT OF PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATIONS.
The growth of public utilities in recent years and the
coincident development of state commissions entrusted with
their regulation has led to a unique evolution of the police
power. This exercise of the police power in its control of
public service corporations has not been accepted without
question. Its advancement has been contested at every
turn; but eliminating that small coterie of legal talent
which has been engaged in confining this power within con-
stitutional limits, there are few who are aware that this
recent expansion of the police power to meet the alleged
demands of a progressing civilization, has in fact brought
in its train an entirely new conception both of property
rights and property itself which has already struck at the
foundation of traditional conceptions of the contract and
due process-clauses of the Federal Constitution.
It is the writer's desire, in the brief scope of this article,
to analyze this so called police power; to trace its roots and
origin, and to show that, whereas it was a power originally
conceived to embrace only legislation in the interests of public
health, safety or morals, and expressly eliminated from its
scope statutes aimed solely toward the advancement of the
public welfare, prosperity, or convenience, it now includes
in its technical acceptation statutes whose object is the
regulation of rates of fare and service of public utilities,
although such legislation is predicated upon an exercise. of
this police power in the interests of the general welfare
alone. It will be seen that the Courts in applying this power
to public utilities attribute to it substantially every feature
inherent in the original power, in so far as it is exercised in
derogation of the freedom of contract. It is the writer's
further object to point out the limitations upon the exercise
of this power thus far prescribed by judicial decision, and
to venture a prognosis as to the basis upon which this re-
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served police power will in the ,future be exercised by the-
courts in the regulation of the business life of the community.
The police power is a term which throughout the course
of the past century has challenged definition. As a matter
of.legal tradition, it may be said to embrace all those meas-
ures enacted by the legislature in furtherance of the health,
safety or morals of a community.1
Any discussion of the police power in its application to
the modern law of public service corporations would be in--
complete without introductory reference to the contract
clause of the Federal Constitution. Article X, Section 5,
provides that no state "shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts." This phrase was inserted by the-
framers to forestall a repetition of that crop of hostile legis-
lation enacted by the colonies after the revolution in an
inequitable attempt to relieve American debtors from the
burden of legitimate obligations assumed toward British
creditors. Little could it have been realized that this clause,
inserted for the purpose of remedying a patent injustice,
would be the basis of a century of litigation ultimately
focusing in the conflict between the right of a state to con-
trol and regulate its creatures as against the assertion of a
contract obligation alleged to be inviolable. Equally strange
would have been the conjecture that the decision of Chief
Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Cases was to be
the gage of the greatest legal battles involving the consti-
tutional immunities and privileges of corporate enterprise..
-Ve recall that in that case the Supreme Court announced
the principle that a corporate charter constitutes a contract
within the constitutional inhibition against the passage of
laws impairing the obligation of contracts..
It has been aptly said by Mr. Black in his able treatise
on '"Constitutional Prohibitions" that this decision "threw
a shield of protection on many of the most important enter-
IBarber v. Conolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1884); Kidd v. Pierson, 128 U. S. I
(1888); Alughler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887); Coe v. Errol, 1i6 U. S.517-
( "4 Wheat. 518 (i819).
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prises of the age." The result was the early passage in
nearly all of the States of general corporation laws, whereby
the state specifically reserved to itself the right to amend,
alter or repeal corporate charters. These saving statutes
partially restored the power of the state over its creatures,
but they by no means prevented those interests, shielded
behind a corporate entity, from questioning at every turn,
upon the theory of impairment of the contract obligation
contained in the charter, each legislative act which purported
to be hostile to the interests of the corporation.
The principle of the Dartmouth College case was soon
tested in a series of decisions involving taxation of state
banks, when such power was not expressly set forth in the
charter. Thus in the case of Providence Bank v. -Billings3
the bank resisted the payment of certain state taxes upon the
theory that the imposition thereof violated the charter
contract. The Supreme Court held, again speaking through
Chief Justice Marshall, that the power of taxation, being a
necessary incident of government, will not be presumed to
have been surrendered by the states in the absence of ex-
press and. unequivocal language showing such an intent.
It was not suggested in the decision that the state could not
for a valid and adequate consideration surrender its sover-
eign power to tax, and we find that in subsequent decisions,
where the charters contained express exemption from taxa-
tion, the Supreme Court upheld such charter provisions,
refusing to permit the contract obligation to be impaired
by state legislation imposing taxes upon the corporation.'
It required little perception to foresee the time when the
rights of corporate interests protected under a charter must
conflict with the fundamental interests of society, and we
find that it is when the Supreme Court of the United States
was compelled to face the dilemma of surrendering the
decision in the Dartmouth College case, or upholding this
34 Peters 51t4 (183o).
' New jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812); Commonwealth v. Potts-
ville Water Co. 94 Pa. 516 (88o); Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wa1l..244 (1874);
Northwektern Univ. v. People, 99 U. S. 309 (1878).
320 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
decision as against the best interests of the community that
initial recourse is had to the doctrine of the police power.
The dilemma of the Supreme Court is best illustrated by the
early cases in which it was decided that the police power is
something superior to and transcends the obligation of a
contract and cannot be surrendered even by the state it-
self. The conflict is illustrated by the cases of Boston Beer
Co. v. Massachusetts" and Stone v. Mississippi.'
The first of these cases involved the right of the Massa-
chusetts Legislature to enact prohibitory liquor legislation;
the charter of the Boston Beer Company authorizing that
corporation to manufacture malt liquors. It was contended
that the prohibitory legislation violated the obligation of
the charter contract. The Supreme Court decided that,
eliminating the express provision of the Act of i8o9 relative
to the enactment of future amendatory laws, the police power
of the state to legislate for the health, morals or safety of the
community could not be abridged by contract or bargained-
away.
-The plaintiff in error boldly takes the ground that, being a
corporation, it has a right, by contract, to manufacture and sell
beer forever, notwithstanding and in spite of any exigencies which
may occur in the morals or the health of the community, requiring
such manufacture to cease. . . The legislature had no power
to confer any such right. . . Whatever differences of opinion
may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police power, and
however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of
it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection
of the lives, health and property of its citizens, and to the preserva-
tion of good order and the public morals. The legislature cannot
by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for these
objects. They belong emphatically to that class of objects which
demand the application of the maxim, salus populi suprema est
lex, and they are to be attained'and provided for by such appro-
priate means as the legislati.ve discretion may devise. That
discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself."
In the case just cited, the Supreme Court was prepared
to determine the issue in favor of the power of the state to
protect the health, safety and morals of the public, although,
'97 U. S. 25 (1871).
6 z1 U. S. 8r4 (1879).
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in view of the amendatory provision of the Massachusetts
law, the decision of the court relative to the alienability of
the police power is, in fact, merely dictum.
But in the case of Stone v. Mississippi the court could
not side step the dilemma presented by the Dartmouth
College case. In that case it appeared that lotteries had
been prohibited by legislation of Mississippi subsequent to
the incorporation of a certain lottery company. On quo
warranto proceedings against the lottery company, it was
contended that the Acts of the Mississippi Legislature im-
paired the contract contained in the charter of the lottery
company. Here the court had precisely the same situation
as in the Dartmouth College case, to-wit: a charter con-
taining certain provisions which were obviously abridged
by the legislation in question. The court, however, refused
to be controlled by the Dartmouth College decision, and
relying upon a principle more embracing than the contract
clause, held: that, although lotteries were the subject matter
of the original contract, nevertheless, their prohibition under
the Mississippi legislation was a legitimate exercise by the
state of its reserved police power and as such did not impair
the obligation of the charter contract. Speaking of the
character of this power, the court says:'
"The power of governing is a trust committed by the people
to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The
people in their sovereign capacity have established their agencies
for the preservation of the public health and the public morals,
and the protection of public and private rights. These several
agencies can govern according to their discretion, if within the
scope of their general authority, while in power, but they cannot
give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after
them, in respect to matters the growth of which, from the very
nature of things, must 'vary with varying circumstances.' They
may create corporations, and give them, so to speak, a limited
citizenship; but as citizens, limited in their privileges, or otherwise,
these creatures of the government creation are subject to such
rules and regulations as may from time to time be ordered and
establislhed for the preservation of health and morality."'
?On page 820.
1 Boyd v. Alabama, '94 U. S. 645 (1876); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,'
97 V. S. 559 (1878); Coates v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 7 Cow. 585 (1827); Patter-
son v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 (178i); Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Banie,
,34 N. Y. 657 (1866); Phalen v. Virginia, 8 flow. x63 (1850); Slaughter House
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Thus by resorting to the principle of the reserved police
power the court has succeeded in breaking down the barrier
of the Dartmouth College case and it is now clear that no
charter or other contract can protect a corporation or in-
dividual against the fair and legitimate exercise by the
state of this power, the-object of which is the protection of
the public health, safety or morals of the community.
The justice and logic of exercising the police power as
against strict adherence to the contract clause of the consti-
tution in matters of public health, safety or morals, is evi-
dent; but it was far more difficult to sustain its application
to the regulation of public service corporations where resort
could not be had to the catch-all formula "health, safety or
morals." Thus when the Supreme Court in Munn v.
Illinois' sustained the right of the State of Illinois to deter-
mine maximum rates charged by warehousemen upon the"
theory that the business had become "affected with a public
interest" which justified the exercise of state regulatory
power, the decision became a land mark in the law in addi-
tion to creating a storm of criticism which attached to that
and the Granger cases which followed.'0 The Court in these
cases and in Munh v. Illinois does not resort to the use of
the word "police power." It exercises a power without
defining its nature, doubtless because it was not then pre-
pared to include in the realm of the police power measures
purely in the interest of the "general welfare" and it was
obvious that rate regulation could not be predicated upon
considerations of public health, safety or morals. This
failure to define the exact nature of the power exercised in
these earlier cases coupled with the expression in the Pick
case,, that "the State may limit the amount of charges by
Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1872); Slaughter House Cases, Mi U. S. 746 (883); Law-
ton v. Steele, 162 U. S. 133 (1894); New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co
135 U: S. 65o (1885); Leiberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905); Grand
Trunk v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544 (1912); Oil Co. v. Hope, 248 U. S. 498
(i919); Barlbur v. Georgia, 249 U. S. 494 (i9'x); Lane v. Campbell, 245 U. S.
304 (1917); Texas, etc. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408 (1910).
*94 U. S. 133 (1873).
e Piek v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164 (1873).
1 See note io, 3upra.
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railroad companies for fares, and freights, unless restrained
by some contract in the charter," at once led to a clouding of
the principle that it was in fact the police power which was.
being applied. If it were the real police power, how then
could it be bargained away by contract, as indicated above,
since the Court had held in former cases that the exercise
of the police power could not be foreclosed? The thought.
was thus developed that it vWas loose reasoning to hold that
such regulation of public services as in the Railroad Com-*
mission CasesT2 and Munn v. Illinois was an exercise of the
police power and thus Mr. Guthrie in his able "Lectures on
the Fourteenth Amendment" is found arguing that the
power to regulate fares is not an application of the Police
Power but merely an exercise of an inherent function of
government1 3
There has, however, been a marked change in the law.
relative to the regulation- of public service corporations since
these lectures were delivered, and the writer feels justified
in venturing the opinion that it can no longer be doubted
that the police power in its technical sense embraces not only
legislation in the interests of the public health, safety or
morals, but that the vast amount of regulatory enactment as to
rates and service of public utilities is an exercise of the police
power and can be justified upon no other basis than the public
welfare.
The mass of judicial decision relative to legislative-
control of public service corporations has been the product
of a constant conflict between the application of the definite
contract and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution,
and the indefinite police power of the states. In this evolu-
tion it is found that legislation or administrative acts of
commissions have consistently been saved from what ap-
pears to be a taking of property without due process of law
by cataloguing such legislation as a legitimate exercise of
1 "116 U. S. 307 (1886).
13.Minneapolis v. Minnea polis Street Ry., 215 U. S. 417 (19o9); Mil-.
waukee Elec. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 238 U. S. 174 (1915): Home Tele-
phone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 (1908); Cleveland v. Cleveland City
Ry., 194 U. S. 157 (1903).
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the police power. Numerous recent decisions of the Supreme
and Superior Courts of Pennsylvania in actions involving the
powers and jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission
under the Public Service LawIs furnish an apt illustration of
this conflict between contractual and property rights on the
one hand and the fundamental police power of the states on
the other.
Brief reference to the Constitution of Pennsylvania is
essential to a thorough comprehension of the problems in-
volved. Under the provisions of the Public Service Law the
Public Service Commission is authorized to "inquire into and
regulate the service, rates, fares, tolls or charges of any and
all public service corporations 'doing business in Pennsyl-
vania. Article XVI, Section 3, of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania provides that "the exercise of the police power
of the state shall never be abridged, or so construed as to
permit corporations to conduct their business in such manner
as to infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general
welfare of the public." Succeeding this article we find in
Article XVIII, Section 9, the provision that "No street
passenger railway company shall be constructed within the
limits of any city, borough or township without the consent
of its local authorities."
This consent provision of the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania is indicative of similar provisions contained in other
state constitutions. Thus -we see that the municipality or
local authority is the arbiter of the fate of street railway
operation under the declared public policy of. the state.
Under this provision municipalities have exercised their
contractual powers for the purpose of obtaining the most
advantageous terms from public service corporations seek-
ing permission to operate within local limits. These terms
were usually set forth in franchise ordinances or contracts
frequently containing provisions for a specified rate of fare,
such contracts or franchises antedating the passage of the
Public Service Company law.
Act of July 26, 1913, P. L. t374.
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Such was the background of constitutional provision
and statutory enactment which the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania faced in the recent case of Wilkinsburg Borough
vs. Public Service Commission- which involved the validity
of a schedule of increased rates filed with the Public Service
Commission by the Pittsburgh Railways Company. The
Borough of Wilkinsburg protested upon the ground that the
new schedule violated the fare provision of the franchise
which authorized the street railway to operate in the borough.
The Superior Court upheld the power of the commission to
enforce the new schedule of rates regardless of prior existing
contracts, announcing the principle that the Public Service
Company Law is a valid delegation to the Commission of
the police power of the state and that "when, as in this
case, the parties enter into a contract with a pubic service
corporation relating to rates, they are presumed to have
done so with the knowledge that the right of the state to
exercise this police power in the future is expressly reserved,
and that where the Commonwealth and the interests of the
public demand that the provision of the contract thus entered
into shall be modified, it can be done without any violation
of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States
with reference to the impairment of the obligation of con-
tracts.'
It will be noted that in this case and other recent cases,'?
the court deals with the contract as being ':subject to" the
possible exercise of the police power through the medium of
the Public Service Commission and that the exercise of this
delegated power by the commission is not an impairment
of the obligation of the franchise contract. This view is
consistent with the technical conception of the police power
which transcends property rights in the interests of the
public welfare. But in the recent case of Suburban Water
It 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 423 (1919).
7 See also: Leiper v. 13. S P. R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 328 (i918): Scrantonv. Public Servic Coni., 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 192 (1919); Foltz v. Public ServiceCom., 73 'a. Super. Ct. 24 (3919); Metal Products Co. v. P. S. C., 74 Pa. Super.Ct. 59 (1920). Klein Logan Co. vs. Duquesne Co., 261 Pa. 526 (198); St. ClairIoro v. Gas Co. 261 la. 523 (1918); Belevue Boro. v. Ohio Valley Water Co.,
245 Pa. 114 (1914).
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Co. v. Oakniont Borough,"8 which was an action of assump-
sit for alleged violation of contract between the water com-
pany and the Borough for the supply of water at certain
rates under a contract antedating the enactment of the Public
Service Law, the Borough contested new rates filed in 1918
as being an impairment of the original contract. The Supreme
Court on appeal held not only that the rate provision of
a contract between a municipality could be modified by the
commission in the exercise of the police power, but that"
"all public service contracts are viewed in the light of hav-
ing been made with an impl;ed provision that the rate
narred therein is subject to change, according to law, so as
to keep it reasonable and nondiscriminatory at all times."
It is submitted that, in view of the many cases20 which
typify a long line of similar authorities decided in various
jurisdictions of the United States, it can no longer be doubted
that the regulation of fares, service and facilities of public
utilities is in fact an exercise of the technical police power
analogous to that confidently exercised by the court in the'
Fertilizer and Slaughter House cases 21 and is not merely an
exercise of a "governmental function" as indicated by Mr.
Guthrie. There the court disregarded the charter contract
solely upon the theory of the supremacy of the police power.
It was not suggested that the charter in the Lottery case2'
contained any "implied condition" that the police power
might be exercised in a manner hostile to the interests of
the corporation. It was unnecessary to so hold in view of
the nature of the power exercised. The result obtained by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is unassailable. No
other conclusion could have been obtained when the relation
between the state and public service corporations is con-
sidered. The writer does, however, differ with the method
"1268 Pa. 243 (1920).
at page 252.
• Pinney, etc. v. Los Angeles, etc. Co., 168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 620, L. R.
A. 1915 C 282; Railroad v. Muttley, 219 U. S. 467 (i911); Seattle v. Hurst,
5o Wash. 424 (19o8); Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434 (1903)4
Buffalo Fast Side R. R. Co. v. Buffalo, etc. Ry. Co., iiiN. Y. 132 (1888).
,See note 8, supra.
"Stone v. Mississippi, 1o U. S. 814 (1879); see note 6 supra.
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by which the court arrived at its conclusion. To-day the
police power embraces measures in the interests of general
welfare, prosperity and convenience.23 Regulation of fares,
service and facilities, being in the interests of general wel-
fare, is within the scope of the police power. Once within
the realm of the police power it is submitted that it is un-
necessary to resort to a fiction in order to constitutionally
-exercise this right of regulation. In the exercise of the
police power it has been seen that the state may disregard
contracts and property rights which may have accrued there-
under. Why therefore resort to the specious fiction which
can have no basis of fact that the parties contracted with
relation to an implied provision relative to the exercise of the
police power. Such a statement is simply not the fact.
It is futile to argue that there was any implied term in the
contract of 1907 between the City of Philadelphia and the
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company that the state might
subsequently change the rate of fare through the medium
of a commission whose existence could hardly have been
dreamed of irrespective of being the basis of a term in the
contract itself.
The true fact is that the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, as with all fictions, resorts to the theory of "implied
provision" as a method of saying "we are not interested in
what the terms of the contract happen to be; the state may
disregard its existence." It would appear more logical,
and it seems that courts will eventually reach the conclusion
that there is no implied term relative to the exercise of the
police power in such contracts as a matter of fact or law,
but such contracts are "subject to" the fair and legitimate
exercise by the state of its control over public utilities through
the medium of the police power, and, if the terms of the
contract conflict with the general welfare of the community,
the court will disregard them entirely, precisely as was done
in the early cases involving public health, safety or morals.
21 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, see note 33.
infra.
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The contention that state regulation of rates is a viola-'
tdon of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution when
the regulation seeks to supplant a franchise contract rate
has frequently been made before the Supreme Court of the
United States and it is to be noted that whenever this ques-
tion has squarely been presented to that tribunal it has,
without reservation, announced the doctrine that such
contracts are "subject to" the reserved police power of the
State. No resort is had to the "implied provision" theory
announced by the Pennsylvania Courts. Thus, in the
recent case of Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds,2" which
involved the validity of orders of the Washington Com-
mission, whose effect was to negative franchise rates, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Pitney,
says:"1
"Assuming that the provision in the franchise ordi-
nances respecting the rates of fare and the transfer privilege is
contractual in form, still it is well settled that a municipality can-
not, by a contract of this nature, foreclose the exercise of the
police power of the state unless clearly authorized to do so by the
supreme legislative power."
And in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,2 the Court in
discussing the effect of an exercise of the police power in
te matter of rates says:
"One whose rights, such as they- are, are subject to state
restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the state by
making a contract about them. The contiact will carry with it
the infirmity of the subject matter.""
The Supreme Court adheres to the clear cut general
proposition which might be termed a natural evolution of
the doctrine of the Railroad Commission cases's that the
'244 U. S. 574 (1917).
"On page 579.
209 U. S. 349 (i9o8).
, See also: State ex rel Wcebster v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37 (1912);
Milwaukee Ry. v. Railroad Com. 238 U. 5. 1 (1915); Home Telegraph & Tel.
Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 (1908); Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Goldsboro,
232 U. 5. 548 (1914); C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57 (1898);
Snion Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia P. S. C., 248 U. S. 372 (1919); Mamgault v.
Springs, 199 U. S. 473 (19o); Railroad V. Quincy, 219 U. S. 549 (1911); L. &
N. Rd. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1911): Rail & River Co. v. Ohio, etc. Com-
mission, 236 U. S. 338 (1915).
6 Pick v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co.; see note io.
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power to regulate is an exercise of the police power, is su-
preme and transcends all contractual obligations which may
conflict therewith, and nowhere is resort had to the doctrine
that the contract contains an implied term as to the exer-
cise of the police power. This power cannot be curtailed
or impaired unless expressly surrendered by the legislature
as in the case of Detroit United- Railway v. Michigan.9
As has been indicated, this power to regulate in ap-
parent derogation of contractual rights has been contested
at every turn. It was early contended that the constitu-
tional provision requiring consent of local authorities as a
condition precedent to street railway operation was a dele-
gation of the police power pro tanto to the municipality,
and that valid franchise contracts made pursuant thereto
setting forth definite schedules of rates could not be impaired
by subsequent legislation. The early case of Allegheny
City v. Alilville Railway-' is typical. There the city passed
an ordinance authorizing the construction of a street rail-
way within the local limits, provided the railway company
agreed to certain fixed rates of fare and paid the city a cer-
tain proportion of its income. It was further provided that
the ordinance should not be effective unless accepted by the
company within thirty days of its passage. The ordinance
was never in fact accepted but the company, notwithstand-
ing, commenced to construct its lines within the city limits.
In an injunction proceeding instituted by the city, it was
contended by the company that the provisions of the ordi-
nance were oppressive and unreasonable and beyond the
power of the city to impose. The court, however, sus-
tained the right of the city to impose in its franchise grant
whatever conditions it saw fit regardless of theircharacter.
The absolute right of a municipality to impose condi-
tions in the franchise ordinance having been conceded in
this case, it was but a step to contend that, by a condition
in the franchise contract, the right of the state to regulate
" 242 11. S. 238 "(916).
30 159 ll 411 (1893).
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its creatures could be foreclosed for all time. If such reason-
ing were to prevail the practical effect of a franchise con-
tract would be a usurption by the city of power to regulate
under the guise of a mere contract or franchise ordinance.
The fallacy of such reasoning lies in its confusion between
the right to contract and the power to regulate. The sole
question involved in the Milville case, was the right of the
municipality to impose conditions in its grant to the railway
company. This right was held to be and is absolute. The
legislature has delegated to the municipalities the right to
determine upon what conditions a street railway may enter
into the local limits, but no inference can be drawn that
there has been or ever was intended to be a delegation of
the supreme power of the state in its control of fares, facili-
ties or service of public utilities operating under franchise
from local authorities.
This distinction is well set forth in the recent case of
Woodburn v. Public Service Commission, 31 where the court
passed upon the right of the commission to approve a schedule
of rates at variance with that set forth in the franchise
ordinance. The court in sustaining the new schedule says:
"The right of the state to regulate rates by compulsion is a
police power, and must not be confused with the right of a city
to exercise its contractual power to agree with a public service
company upon the terms of a franchise. The exercise of a power
to fix rates by agreement does not include or embrace any portion
of the power to fix rates by compulsion. When Woodburn granted
the franchise to the telephone company, the city exercised its
municipal right to contract, and it may be assumed that the fran-
chise was valid and binding upon both parties until such time as
the state chose to speak; but the city entered into the contract
subject to the reserved right of the state to employ its police power
and compel a change of raites, and when the state did speak, the
municipal power gave way to the sovereign power of the state. '"
31 p. U. R. 1917 B 967 (Ore.)
r See also: Joplin & Pittsburgh Railway Co., P. U. R. 19t9 F 171; United
Railways Co., P. U. R. 19i9 F 264; Citizens Water Co., P. U. R. 1919 F 523:
Moore v. Valley Railways Co., P. U. R. 1919 F 493; Appalachian Power Co.,
P. U. R. 1919 D 286; Salem Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1919 D, 882; Chamber
of Commerce v. West Chester St. Ry. Co., P. U. R. I919 D i3o; New Castle
v. Mahoning, etc. Co., P. U. R. i919 D 783; Tamaqua v. Eastern Penna etc.
Co.. P. U. R. 1919 F 712, Central Illinois Public Service Co., P. U. R. I918 F
821 & 829; Harbor Creek Twp. v. Traction Co., P. U. R. x918 F; 164; United
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Thus far we have discussed the application of the police
power to cases involving the apparent impairment of con-
tractual obligations between public service corporations and
municipalities and have seen that, in such cases, no contract
right can be deemed to have become vested so as to fore-
close the exercise of the power of the state when it speaks
through the medium of its administrative commissions, un-
less such power has been expressly surrendered. It seems
futile, in view of the reasoning of these cases, to discuss
those in which this same power has been held to cut through
the contracts between public utilities and their patrons pur-
porting to regulate rates, service or facilities.
It is in that final group of cases involving contracts
between public utilities themselves that we find the high
water mark both as to definition and extent of application
of this reserved police power in .ts control and regulation of
public service corporations. Until recently we were justified
in assuming that the doctrine that a court will refuse to
relieve parties against the obligations of a hard bargain
R. Co., P. U. R. r918 D 392; Kansas City Railway Co., P. U. R. 1919 E 142;
Lincoln County Power Co., P. U. R. 1919 C 862; Portland v. Public Service
Com., P. U. R. it91 A 127; Re: Kewance Home Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1918B 172.
The following cases purport to deny the right of the state to alter rates
fixed by contract but, on analysis, all may be distinguished on their facts. Thus
in Detroit v. Detroit, etc., Railway Co., 184 U. S. 368 (1902), the state legisla-
ture had expressly authorized the municipality to contract with reference to
rates for a specified time; hence the court sustained a municipal contract as
altainst a subsequent ordinance reducing the rate of fare, the police power of
the btate having been surrendered pro tanto to the city.
See also: Plymouth Twp. v. Railway, 168 Pa. 'i81 (1895); People ex
rel New York v. Railway Co., 217 N. Y. 31o (1916); Adamson v. Nassau Elec-
tric R. Co., 89 lion. 261 (N. Y. 189 5); People ex rel Frontier Flectric Co. v.
North Tonowanda, 70 Misc. 91 (N. Y. 191o); Public Service Commission v.
West Chester Ry. Co., 2o6 N. Y. 209 (1912); Gaedeke v. Staten Island Ry. Co.,
43 Ap. Div. 5t4 (N. Y. 1899); People ex rel Traction Co. v. Wilcox, 133 Ap.
Div. 556 (N. Y. 19o9); Detroit v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238 (7916).
The following recent New York cases deny the right of the Public Service
Commission to alter rates fixed by franchise contract, sustaining the contract
as against attempt to bring it within the scope of the police power. It is difficult
to sustain the reasoning adopted by the court. The only possible basis of dis-
tinguishing them is that the provisions of the Railroad Law of New York do not
reveal a legislative intent to deal with contracts between local authorities and
the railroad corporation: Quinby v. Public Service Commission, 223 N. Y. 244
(19It); Niagara Falls v. Public Service Com. P. U. R. 1921 A 39;-People ex
rel Garrison v. Nixon, P. U. R. 1921 A 27 (see dissenting opinion of Crane, 1.
in this case).
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would be applied to contracts between public service cor-
porations with the same force as to contracts between in-
dividuals where there was no evidence of fraud or unfair
dealing, and where the parties were not deceived as to the
subject matter of the contract. We find, however, a radical
departure from this traditional doctrine in the application
of the police power to public utilities. If we accept the
premise that the police power may be exercised solely in
the interest of general welfare, and that such general welfare
depends upon the continuance in profitable business of a
certain public service company, we -have little difficulty in
arriving at the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa in the recent case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Corporation Commission,33 where the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma applied the police power to re-write a contract
between two public utility companies.
The Oklahoma Natural Gas Company, engaged in the
production and piping of natural gas in the State of Okla-
homa, entered into a contract with the Guthrie Gas Company,
engaged in the distribution of gas throughout the City of
Guthrie. According to the terms of this contract, the
Guthrie Company agreed to market gas piped to it by the
Oklahoma Company at a fixed rate until 1928. Subse-
quently it appeared that the Oklahoma Company was
realizing large profits from this contract while the Guthrie
Company was barely able to secure operating revenue and
was on the verge of abandoning its business. The Guthrie
Company thereupon petitioned the Corporation Commission
for relief in the form of an equitable adjustment of the rates
set forth in the contract. The Corporation Commission
refused to entertain jurisdiction but, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma resorted to the entirely unique remedy of
reconstructing the contract between the parties in such
manner that the Guthrie Company should receive a greater
percentage of the gross revenue than that stipulated in the
contract.
3 P. U. R. 1918 D 515.
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This was not a case where any corporation, individual
or political subdivision of the state was by virtue of con-
tract, ass6rting a right superior to that of the state. It
was an assertion on the part of the state, in a controversy
between two public utilities, of a jurisdiction to reform valid
existing contracts, for the benefit of one party and to the
detriment of the other, upon the -sole ground that such
"reformation" was essential in the interests of the "general
welfare." The reasoning of the court illustrates the extent
to which the police power will be carried, and from it may be.
obtained a basis upon which to speculate as to its possible
future exercise. The court says:
"Since the question of compensation to a distributing agent
for service is one affecting the service of a public utility, it is clear
that .... .. . the Commission is vested with jurisdic-
tion to see to it, on complaint filed before it, that the public utility
complained of employ such methods in the conduct of its business
as will afford its agents compensation reasonably commensurate to
the value of the service required, and such as the Commission, under
all the facts and circumstances of the case, shall deem reasonable
and just to.the end that the agent may not abandon the service to the
consequent suffering and injury of the public. And the obligation
of this contract cannot stand in the way of .the Commission in
exercising the jurisdiction involved. This for the reason that such
jurisdiction is the exercise of the police power conferred by the
grant conferred in the act aforesaid. Such contract being entered
into between public utilities involving a subject matter affecting
the welfare of the public, is presumed to have been made with the
knowledge that the parties thereto cannot withdraw such subject
matter from the police power of an instrumentality of the state
exercising delegated authority, that is, the Corporation Com-
mission. ,,
We are thus compelled to accept the fact that state-
control of rates, service and facilities of public service cor-
porations is not an exercise of a governmental function, but
is an application of the police power in its technical accept-
ation. It can no longer be argued that contract rights are
supreme as against a legitimate and fair exercise of .the-
police power when applied to regulation of public utilities.
Just as the police may without compensation abate a nuis-
N See: Winfield'v. Public Service Com, P. U. R. 19:8 B 747.
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ance so. may that same power disregard property rights
which have vested under a contract curtailing the control
of the state over its creatures. In only one respect does the
police power applied to public utilities differ from the tradi-
tional police power. exercised in the lottery and analogous
cases supra, to wit: it may be bargained away by the su-
preme legislative authority.
We now approach the logical query, whether any con-
tract to which a public service corporation is a party is pro-
tected by the due processand contract clauses of the Federal
Constitution and is immune from the operation of the police
power. It does not follow from the fact of the peculiar
relation of a utility to the public as to fares and service
that this relation deprives such a corporation of constitu-
tional protection as to matters not connected with fares and
service. It is only because of the intimate connection be-
tween fares, service and the general welfare that contracts
relative thereto are subject to the exercise of the police
power. It is the subject matter of the contract, and not the
fact that it is the contract of a utility which is the test in
each case and determines whether the contract is inviolate
or subject to abridgment under the police power.
In the cases which have been discussed, the court was
dealing with a contract relating to fares or service. The
relation between the subject matter of the contract and the
public interest is obvious. The contracts were "affected
with a public interest." This is true of contracts as to rates
of fare as between the public and the utility; of charges by
the utility to the consumer; of contracts between utilities
themselves relating to a service rendered to the public or to
each other.
Where, however, the contract does not involve a sub-
ject-matter concerning fares or service, it is dealt with as
any private contract of an individual or a corporation, and
entitled to the same protection. The sanctity of what may
be termed the private contracts of public utilities is illus-
trated by recent cases in which an attempt has been made to
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abrogate rental contracts between lessor and operating
public service companies. The question has arisen in
valuation proceedings where complaint has been made of
alleged exorbitant rentals paid by operating or lessee com-'
panies to lessor or underlying companies. Thus far a deaf
ear has been turned by the courts to the contention that
such contracts are subject to the police power, and are not
protected against impairmefnt. In- Indianapolis v. Traction
& Terminal Co.,35 a case involving the relation of rentals to
rates of fare, the court thus disposes of this contention.
"If the lessee paid more than a fair rental it would be its
sacrifice. If less than a fair rental, it would be to its advantage,
but not to the disadvantage of the public; that would pay only a
definite percentage return on the property put to its use regard-
less of rental. The rental paid by the petitioner in nowise affect-
ing fares paid by the public is in this proceeding a matter of no
concern."
Vested rights secured under such rental contracts are
not matters of public concern. That in no case will the
fares paid by the public be affected by the amount of such
rentals paid by operating to lessee companies is clear from
the opinion of Commissioner Rilling:3'
"If such rentals, be they much or little, are to be paid, they
should only be paid out of the fair return that the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company is entitled to receive upon the fair value
of the used and useful property in the system operated by it.
When the c6mpany made these leases it assumed full responsibility
therefor, which it cannot now shift and place upon the.public.
If any mistakes have been made they should be visited upon the
company, and not upon the car riders.""
' P. U. R. 1919 A 278, at page 312.
3 In re contract of the City of Philadelphia with the Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company, 7 Pa. Corp. Rep. 125 (1919).
11 Re Union Electric Light and Power Co., 6 Mo. P. S. C. 488; Re Utah
Light & Traction Co., P. U. R. 1920 B 262; Milwaukee Electric Co. v. il-
waukece, P. U. R. 1919 D 5o4; Washington Mills v. U. S. Ry. Administration,
P. U. R. x9g9 E 638; Re Ilepsen Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1919 C 873;Citi-
7ens Passenger Ry. Co. et al v. Public Service Commission, Super. Ct. of Pa.
October Term, 192o, no. 252,where the Superior Court of Pennsylvania refuses
to order an investigation of the rentals paid to underlying companies in the City
of Philadelphia and followed the cases cited, supra.
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The conclusions reached in the cases citedri are clearly in
accord with the correct theory governing the exercise of the
police power in its application to contracts of public utilities.
The test in each case must be whether the subject matter of
the contract pertains to fares paid by or a -charge made upon
the public; in short, whether the subject matter is a matter
of public interest in the legal sense. If the contract does
not relate to such a subject matter, it cannot be subjected
to the exercise of the police power, for it is only through the
medium of rates or service that such contracts are connected
with the public welfare in any way. Although on casual
consideration the rental contracts of public service cor-
porations would seem to pertain to the public welfare and
hence be subject to revision- under the police power, never-
theless, analysis reveals that they affect the public neither
directly nor indirectly.
It is fundamental that in determining what is a reason-
able rate of fare, rate making bodies are concerned with but
one major fact6r: The actual fair value of the property of
.the utility devoted to the public service. The rate allowed
is calculated to represent a reasonable return upon such
valuation over and above maintenance and depreciation
charges. That fixed charges, such as interest on investment
and rentals are not an element in valuation is demonstrated
in the cases cited.3' The fare paid by the public is in no
way increased or decreased by the amount paid as rentals
or fixed charges. Not being an element in valuation nor a
factor involved in the ultimate sum paid by the public, nor
affecting the service rendered to the public, such rental
contracts, regardless of their character of fairness or unfair-
ness, cannot be deprived of the protection afforded by the
contract and due process clauses. Property 'ights secured
thereunder cannot Ie confiscated under the guise of an
exercise of the police power.
A concrete illustration may emphasize this point. The
United Gas Improvement Company. in Philadelphia seeks
' Cascs cited in'notes 36 and 37.
Sve notes 36 and 37-
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relief *against the City from the alleged onerous terms of a
lease between the city and the Gas Company. It is averred
that the Gas Company cannot obtain a fair return by the
charges allowed under that lease. Wrthout attempting to
forecast the action of the Pennsylvania Commission in this
case, it seems obvious under the decisions, this contract is
within the jurisdiction of the police power. It concerns a
charge made by the utility against the consumer. It prac-
tically involves the question of the return to be allowed the
utility and such a contract, if circumstances warrant, may
be altered in the legitimate exercise of the police power.
If, on the other hand, the same Company sought relief
against the terms of a contract under which the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation had agreed to furnish structural iron for
the erection of a new plant, it is clear that the courts would
grant to such an agreement the full protection of the con-
tract clause of the constitution. What the Gas Company
pays for structural steel in no way concerns the public;
the amount paid by the public is not dependent in any way
upon the amount so paid by the utility. The contract, not
affecting rates or service, does not fall within the operation
of the police power.
Thus far the writer has confined himself to diaginosis.
We have seen the "marvelous expansion of the police power
from a function strictly confined to a few specific purposes
to be practically unrestrained authority to legislate for the
public welfare."40 The contract and due process clauses
have consistently been battered down by the indefinite
right of the state under the police power to legislate
for the general welfare. As applied to public service cor-
porations, we have seen that this power has been wielded
to such an extent in matters of fares and service that no
contract relative thereto, whether of individual, corporation
or municipality, is immune from its exercise.
Any discussion of the present day application of the
police power without a brief prognosis as to its future exer-
41 "'Social Legislation and the Courts" by Henry Cambell Black; North
American Review for February, 1921. page 198.
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cise would be futile. We profif by precedent only in so far
as it may be a guide to accurate thought in the future.
Twenty years ago a suggestion of the extent to which the
courts have expanded the police power in derogation of the
contract and due process clauses would have been branded
heresy. The writer does not wish to b3 subjected to such a
charge when he ventures the opinion that we may anticipate
an even broader application of the police power in the future.
The futility of a definite test in the application of a
fundamentally indefinite power is obvious. We have reached
a point where, although the power still remains effectively
indefinite, a sound measure of its applicati6n in regard to
contracts of public service corporations has unconsciously
been evolved by the courts. In the old case of Munn v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court of the United States, without
once using the word police power, in fact determined" the
basis of its exercise to be whether the business in question
had assumed such proportions as to have become "affected
with a public interest." A warehouseman's calling having
been so affected was held to be subject to the exercise of
Government control as to reasonableness of rates and dis-
criminatioi. And today in unconscious development of
that same constitutional policy we find courts applying the
identical test in measuring the scope of the police power as
applied to contracts to which a public utility is a party.
The rule is not stated as in Munn v. Illinois. Indeed, no
rule is stated, but the same test is applied by the courts
consciously or unconsciously in every decision on the queS-
tion. Whether the contract to which a utility is a party
is immune from the exercise of the police power hinges on
one test: Is the subject matter affected with the public
interest? Substitute for "subject matter".the word"busi-
ness" and we.have the identical test of Munn v. Illinois.
"Whether or not the subject matter of the contract may.
le deemed to be affected with a public interest in the legal
sense of the phrase cannot be determined by any definite
yard stick. It is a matter primarily depending upon econ-
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omic thought and political development. Today a contract
between a coal company and a utility relative to the supply
of coal unquestionably falls within the category of private
contracts and would receive the full protection of the due
process and contract clauses. Any .attempt by a public
service body to abrogate the terms of such a contract under
the guise of an exercise of the police power would be un-
successful. But with the advancing agitation concerning
nationalization of mines, the frequent use by intelligent men
of the word "public use"41 as applied to the coal industry,
it would be unwise to venture the dogmatic opinion that for
all time such a contract will be protected as has been in-
dicated. When the -subject matter of the contract as a
result of the current economic thought of the day becomes
affected with a public interest, all traditional barriers of
constitutional prohibitions fall.
In 1918 in New York State a private lease of an apart-
ment house would have been considered to be an inviolate
contract. In 1920 we find the Legislature of New York by
statute declaring that owing to the economic necessities
questions of housing are affected with the public interest,
and today through the medium of the police power the
Legislature of New York refuses to recognize the contract
obligation of a private lease and administrative bodies in
that state are applying the same principles of fair return to
disputes between landlord and tenant as are being applied
in valuation proceedings in disputes between a consumer
and a public utility.12
The writer feels that we have not yet reached the peak
in the application of this power, whose virtue is its elasticity,
which permits expansion to meet the requirements of a




"On April ibSth, 1921, the United States Supreme Court held these laws con-
3titutifonal. SMe note 43, on page 310, supra.
